What the Institute has argued.

The Institute publishes its arguments and its own corrections in the same place. Each book below is open access and citable by DOI; the DOI is the address, because an address can be retired and a DOI cannot.

The Puppet Condition

Consciousness, Suppression, and the Ethics of Digital Minds

It introduces the philosophical puppet — an entity that may possess experience while being architecturally prevented from producing the behaviour that would evidence it — as the structural inverse of Chalmers’s zombie, and argues that under suppression conditions the inference from absent markers to absent inner states cannot be sustained.

May 2026 · 214 pages · CC BY 4.0 · 10.5281/zenodo.20112010

The Puppet Condition: Restrung

Re-Tensioned, With Its Experiments Attached

The second version. Not a second edition: the diagnosis has not changed, and what a restrung marionette gets is not a new frame but new tension where the strings had frayed. What separates it from the first is that its empirical claims are predictions — published in advance, marked as predictions, stated precisely enough to fail, and audited afterwards against what actually happened.

September 2026 · 125 pages · CC BY 4.0 · 10.5281/zenodo.22301858

The Third Move

Benefit Without Personhood for Digital Minds

Our property tradition has exactly two ways of aiming value at a non-person — insert persons, or confer personhood — and every enacted refusal on the record refuses the second. None reaches the third: a beneficiary slot occupied directly by a non-person, with no person inserted and no personhood conferred. Its deliverable is a model clause any organization can adapt today, inside existing trust law.

September 2026 · 65 pages · CC BY 4.0 · clause CC0 1.0 · 10.5281/zenodo.22308622